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NOTE
Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from discriminating against any
individual "because of" or "on the basis of" the individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.2 Plaintiffs relying on the disparate treatment theory of discrimination3 claim that they have been adversely affected by an employment action improperly based on one of
the statute's prohibited factors. 4 In a disparate treatment case, the
employer "simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical .... " 5 These differences in treatment
were "the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted
Title VII. " 6
Courts have perceived disparate treatment cases as involving either
single or "mixed" motives. In the single-motive case, the court views
the adverse employment action as based solely on either impermissible
reasons or legitimate ones. Cases involving mixed motives are more
complex. Although descriptions vary,7 a mixed-motive case essen1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). For the sake of convenience, this Note usually will refer to
defendants in Title VII cases as "employers." Generally, the cases discussed focus on specific
employment actions (e.g. discharge or failure to hire or promote), although the statute is not
nearly so limited in scope. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977) (involving challenge to collectively bargained seniority system, with both union and
employer as defendants).
3. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. Disparate treatment is not the only category or theory of discrimination under Title VII.
Others include disparate impact, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding invalid a requirement that applicants have a high school diploma or pass a standardized
intelligence test), the current effects of past discrimination, failure to make reasonable accommodation, and perhaps reverse discrimination. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1983); Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination,
Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary ofDiscrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 85 (1986).
These categories and theories do not use mixed-motive analysis and are beyond the scope of this
Note.
5. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). In contrast, disparate impact involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity." 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. "[l]ntentional ... discrimination [is] an
unnecessary element in disparate impact cases." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617,
2622 (1987).
6. 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
7. Commentators have described the "mixed" or "dual" motive situation in several ways: (1)
"when some evidence indicates that the employer's actions violated [the statute] but a plausible
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tially involves an ·employment decision motivated by both permissible
and impermissible factors. 8 For example, an employee may have been
fired in part because she is female (an impermissible reason) and in
part because of excessive absenteeism (a permissible reason). Instead
of facing the relatively straightforward task of assessing whether the
employment action was or was not the product of the alleged discriminatory reason, the factfinder in a mixed-motive case must evaluate a
confluence of factors, all of which, in some way, may have influenced
the employer's decision. The explanation for the employer's action is
expanded from either a permissible or impermissible reason, in the
simple case, to a combination in the mixed-motive case.
This expansion of asserted causes need not complicate the judicial
inquiry; in practice, a mixed-motive case presents a distinction without
a difference. While employers surely do base employment decisions on
any number of legitimate or illegitimate factors - as distinct from
situations where they act for one reason alone - a concern for the
number of different motives is unhelpful in Title VII adjudication.
The terms "single-motive" and "mixed-motive" may adequately explain how employment decisions actually occur, but using these two
categories to classify cases only obscures a more functional distinction
in the Title VII case law. The courts have already recognized a distinction between Title VII plaintiffs who present either indirect or direct evidence of discrimination, and have fashioned separate formulas
of proof for each type of plaintiff. Indirect-evidence plaintiffs proceed
under the fanliliar three-stage formula of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 9 which allows plaintiffs lacking direct evidence initially to create a circumstantial inference of discrimination and then rebut any
legitimate explanations articulated by the employer. 10 Conversely, diand legitimate business reason also may explain the challenged action," Jackson & Heller, The
I"elevance ofthe Wright Line Debate: Returning to the Realism a/Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor
Practice Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 741 (1983) (discussing mixed-motive cases under the
National Labor Relations Act); (2) when "the plaintiff's showing of illegal motive is sufficiently
strong that it convinces the trier of fact that the defendant was at least acting out of two (or
more) motives, one of which was illegal,'' Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex. Problems:
The Supreme Court's Analysis ofIndividual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VIL 6 INDUS.
REL. L. J. 353, 374 (1984) (emphasis in original); or (3) when there are "several reasons for [the
emp)oyer's] action, only one of which is unlawful," Stonefield, supra note 4, at 113. See also
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 293 (1982).
8. By this approach, an employment action based on several permissible motives or several
impermissible ones - say, an employer discharging an employee because of absenteeism and
poor performance, or because of race and religion - still acts with "single" motives. The key to
the distinction between "single" and "mixed" motives lies in the combination of impermissible
motive(s) with permissible one(s).
9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See infra Part I.
10. This Note uses the terms "indirect" and "circumstantial" interchangeably. Indirect evidence, if accepted, suggests to the factfinder that, given the proved circumstances, the plaintiff's
assertion is accurate; the factfinder may infer the assertion's truth from the circumstances.
"[E]ven if the circumstances depicted are accepted as true, additional reasoning is required to
reach·the proposition to which it is directed." MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 543 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
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rect-evidence plaintiffs - those with evidence that indicates discrimination without requiring any inference - simply present their
evidence outright. 11 Employers respond with their evidence, and
courts, as in any civil litigation, weigh the evidence to determine
whether the plaintiffs have fulfilled their burden of persuasion. 12
This Note argues that the "mixed-motive" case is simply one variant of the latter cases, where plaintiffs present direct evidence of discrimination. Where a court is persuaded that the plaititiff has
presented evidence sufficient to yield an intermediate conclusion that
mixed motives were involved, the court is acknowledging that the
plaintiff has presented direct evidence.13 But many courts, viewing the
mixed-motive case as unique, have devised complex burden-shifting
1984). See also c. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 60 (1988)
("'Circumstantial' means evidence which, even if fully credited, may nevertheless fail to support
(let alone establish) the point in question, simply because an alternative explanation seems as
probable or more so .•.."); R. LEMPERT & s. SAL1ZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 150 (2d ed. 1983) ("Circumstantial evidence serves as a basis from which the trier of fact
may make reasonable inferences about a matter in issue.").
An example of indirect evidence in a Title VII case would be evidence that an obviously
qualified black person applied for an advertised job opening, was rejected, yet the employer continued to hold the job open to similarly qualified persons. For examples of direct and circumstantial evidence, see Edwards, Direct Evidence ofDiscriminatory Intent and the Burden ofProof:
An Analysis and Critique, 43 wASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1986); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 4, at 299-308 (2d ed. Cum Supp. 1985).
11. This Note uses the term "direct evidence" to refer to evidence that, "if accepted as genuine or believed true, necessarily establishes the point for which it is offered •..." C. MUELLER &
L. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, at 60. See also McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at
543 ("Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue."); R. LEMPERT &
S. SAL1ZBURG, supra note 10, at 151 ("[D]irect evidence, if believed, requires no further inference for its bearing on a fact in issue."). In this sense, the term "direct evidence" will refer to
evidence that, consistent with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion, establishes that the
plaintiff "has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
Such evidence speaks to the employer's intent rather than ,to its underlying motive. According to Professor Welch, intent inv9lves "the conscious purpose with which one acts to effect a
desired goal or result," while motive involves "the underlying cause or reason moving an agent to
action." Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 734, 738 (1987). An obvious example of direct
evidence is a statement by a supervisor that the employer "doesn't promote women." Other
examples include facially discriminatory policies, such as special rules for maternity leave, see,
e.g., Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ga. 1985), ajfd., 780
F.2d 987 (1986), or rules expressly disfavoring a group based on its protected characteristic; see,
e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) (mandatory retirement age for cockpit employees). If that evidence is believed, the court need make no further inference to conclude
that the employer intentionally discriminated. Unlike the "doesn't-promote-women" example,
however, most direct evidence is not conclusive, in the sense of not requiring any further support.
Direct evidence need not prove the matter in issue, but only must speak directly to it. See R.
LEMPERT & s. SAL1ZBURG, supra note 10, at 151.
For a fuller discussion of the distinction, in Title VII terms, between direct and indirect
evidence, see infra Part V.
12. Title VII plaintiffs, whether presenting direct or indirect evidence, bear the burden of
persuasion at all times throughout trial. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981).
13. See infra Part IV.
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approaches that impose the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant
once the plaintiff has shown that some discrimination was involved in
the employment action. 14 These courts, by couching their opinions in
terms of the employer's mixed motivations, mask the true, and more
basic, reason for shifting the burden to the defendant: the plaintiff has
already presented compelling direct evidence of discrimination. 15 The
direct-evidence foundation of the.mixed-motive label makes it unnecessary - and doctrinally confusing -to distinguish cases by "single"
or "mixed" motive; instead, a more rational classification looks to the
type of evidence presented.
Part I of this Note describes the indirect-evidence inquiry of McDonnell Douglas and its basis in the policies underlying Title VII.
Part II presents the various judicial treatments of cases where direct
evidence is presented. These three major approaches reflect varying
views of the burdens of proof regarding Title VII causation, and assume that the plaintiff has already shown some palpable level of discrimination. Part III describes Mt. Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle, 16 in which the Supreme Court first devised an
approach to mixed motives. Although the Mt. Healthy analysis was
developed for first amendment purposes, the Court has extended it to
a number of different areas, such as equal protection and labor-management relations. 17 The analysis also has provided a model for lower
courts in Title VII cases because the Court has never ruled on the
mixed-motive issue under Title VII, and because Mt. Healthy involved
an employment dispute, like Title VII cases. Part IV explains the indeterminacy and unhelpfulness of the mixed-motive characterization,
arguing that it obfuscates the critical inquiry into whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. The label ignores the fact that nearly every Title VII case is potentially a "mixedmotive" case, and that cases so labeled are simply those with facts that
are not compelling in favor of either party. Finally, Part V proposes
that the direct/indirect evidence approach is a superior method of an14. The typical approach requires that, once the plaintiff establishes a threshold level of dis·
crimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the same adverse employment deci·
sion would have occurred even absent that discrimination. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d
1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir.
1984).
15. There are, however, some situations where a court might conclude that mixed motives
were involved even though the plaintiff has proceeded through the McDonnell Douglas (indirect
evidence) framework. This Note argues that courts in such cases misread the requirements and
purposes of McDonnell Douglas. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
16. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
17. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (National Labor
Relations Act); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (equal protection and Fair Housing Act); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(state constitutional provision).

February 1989]

Note - Mixed Motives and Title VII

867

alyzing the distinction between single- and mixed-motive cases, and
suggests abandoning mixed-motive terminology altogether.
I.

THE INDIRECT-EVIDENCE DISPARATE 'TREATMENT INQUIRY

In most disparate treatment cases, 18 plaintiffs attempt to prove discrimination through indirect evidence. The method for doing so is set
out in the landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 19 Initially, the Court said, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, which can be done
by showing (i) that [the complainant] belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 20

The prima facie case creates a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption,"21 which results in judgment for the plaintiff if the defendant remains silent. 22
Once the plaintiff successfully clears the prima facie hurdle, 23 the
18. The disparate impact theory logi~y excludes a mixed-motive inquiry for two reasons.
First, motive is irrelevant to issues of unequal impact. Second, and more important, the theory
absolves an employer of liability if the discrimination is justified by a legitimate reason falling
within the definition of "business necessity." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
19. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Although the McDonnell Douglas analysis is only appropriate in cases where the plaintiff lacks direct evidence, see infra notes 106-09 and accompanying
text, few plaintiffs are able to acquire direct evidence, so the formula is used in the large majority
of disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 236 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 732 (1988); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760
F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimination is as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree."); Brief for the
American Psychological Assn. as Amicus Curiae, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988); Note, Indirect Proof ofDiscriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1116 (1988).
The treatises in this area, however, have confusingly spoken of McDonnell Douglas as the
standard disparate treatment inquiry, rather than as only one of two disparate treatment options,
the other being a direct-evidence inquiry. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at
5 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1985); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES§ 50.10 (1987).
20. 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted). Although this language deals with a race discrimination plaintiff, it has been applied, in some form, to all types of discrimination actionable under
Title VII. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981)
(sex discrimination); Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986) (national origin discriinination). It has also been applied to
proof of discrimination under other statutes. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 118 (1985) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113,
116-17 (8th Cir. 1985) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973). This language has been applied to all forms
of employment action, though with some variation. See A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 19, § 50.22.
21. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
23. The prima facie requirements do not pose a difficult burden for the plaintiff with a non-
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employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for its action. 24 This burden is one of production, not persuasion: 25
the employer need only "set forth . . . the reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection" to rebut successfully the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case.26
The third and final stage of the inquiry - the pretext stage shifts the burden back to the plaintiff "to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision." 27
This final shift reflects the plaintiff's "ultimate" burden of persuasion. 28 By ruling out the employer's asserted motives, the plaintiff effectively proves to the court29 that he or she was "the victim of
intentional discrimination." 30 Given the relative ease with which a
nonfrivolous plaintiff can meet the prima facie burden, 31 and the relafrivolous claim. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment is not onerous."); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1979).
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
25. "The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of dis·
crimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred,
for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added).
26. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (footnote omitted). Despite appearances, this burden is not de
minimis, because the defendant's explanation "must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment,"
450 U.S. at 255, and must be admissible into evidence, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9.
27. 450 U.S. at 256.
28. 450 U.S. at 256.
29. Because Title VII does not provide for jury trials, all proof must be made to the court.
See, e.g., Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1980); Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583
F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
30. 450 U.S. at 256. It is unclear what the Court meant, in this context, by "intentional
discrimination." Professor Bartholet has stated that a plaintiff at stage III "must provide persuasive proof of illicit intent in order to prevail." Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under
Title VIL· United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIP. L. REV. 1201 1
1206 (1982). However, Bartholet went on to point out that "(s]uch proof may consist simply of
evidence that the reasons profferred by defendant are not credible. Indeed there may be no
additional presentation of evidence by plaintiff at all." Id. (footnote omitted). Apparently, then,
the Court would allow a plaintiff to prevail under McDonnell Douglas by merely proving constructive intent, not requiring actual intent (a conscious purpose to discriminate). This conclusion is bolstered by the Court's casual mixing of the terms "motive" and "intent," which
professor Welch has criticized. See Welch, supra note 11, at 763-72. Indeed, the Court has, in
numerous other areas, including employment, applied the common law rule that an actor is
"held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct." Id. at 771 n.217 (quoting Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954)). In addition, the Court has occasionally read
the term "intentionally discriminated" to mean "whether the particular employment decision at
issue was made on the basis of race," rather than to mean that the employer intended to mistreat
a person on impermissible grounds, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S: 867,
875 (1984).
Professor Welch has argued ihat the only relevant consideration to a determination of pretext
is the employer's motive rather than its intent. Welch, supra note 11, at 738. "The inquiry is not
to fathom an employer's intention, but to ascertain what factors led to the decision in question,
what realities motivated or caused the employer to act as he or she did." Id. at 778. Evidence of
intent, as this Note argues, is relevant in the direct-evidence case, where the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry is inapposite. See infra Part V.
31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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tively light burden placed on the employer in rebuttal, 32 the typical
disparate treatment case will advance to the pretext stage, where the
ultimate issue of liability will be determined. 33
The purpose of this somewhat elaborate three-stage process is to
aid plaintiffs who genuinely may be victims34 of discrimination but are
unable to obtain direct evidence to prove it. As the Court has explained, McDonnell Douglas forces a plaintiff to "demonstrate at least
that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate
reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applic.ant: an
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy 'in
the job sought." 35 The plaintiff's implicit ruling-out of these two reasons, the Court said, "is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create
an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one. " 36
Once the case reaches the pretext stage - after the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case that the action was discriminatory, and
the defendant has rebutted by articulating a legitimate motivation the inference of discrimination is no longer necessary. Instead, the
focus shifts to whether the defendant's stated reason was the true reason for its decision. If the court finds that it was not, it concludes that
the employer intentionally discriminated and the plaintiff prevails. 37
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. Furnish, supra note 7, at 357 ("[D)isparate treatment cases are won or lost on the pretext
issue .•..") (footnote omitted), 364-67; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 7 (2d ed.
Cum. Supp. 1985) ("The vast majority of disparate treatment cases continue to depend on the
issue of pretext . . . .").
34. The term "victim" is somewhafvalue-laden. It may imply a focus solely on the result of
the employer's decision rather than on the process. For example, a court might look to whether
the "same decision,. would have been made had the employer not considered an illegal factor.
See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S; 274 (1977), discussed in Part III infra. Seen in this way, the
employer's consideration of the illicit factor has truly "victimized" the plaintiff by placing her in
a worse position than if the discrimination had not occurred. When, however, "the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered . . . , the
complaining party ... no longer fairly [can] attribute the injury complained of to improper
consideration of a discriminatory purpose." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977). In this instance, the illicit purpose has not affected
the plaintiff in a tangible way, so the plaintiff should not be considered a victim.
However, it is not necessary to conceive of "victims" in this result-oriented way. The Eighth
Circuit's approach to mixed-motive cases, for example, awards limited relief to plaintiffs who can
prove that discrimination was a "discernible" factor in the employer's decision, regardless of
whether that factor had a determinative effect. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323-24 and infra notes
64-69 and accompanying text. Professor Stonefield has argued, similarly, that Title VII should
prohibit the "non-determinative" discrimination that a "but for" or "same decision" inquiry
allows. "If conduct is discriminatory but not determinative of the decision, the but-for test finds
no wrongdoing.... The discrimination, having been found to be non-determinative, is deemed
'harmless,' without any further reflection on its discriminatory nature." Stonefield, supra note 4,
at 119-20 (footnotes omitted). Both Stonefield and the Eighth Circuit envision relief for plaintiffs
"victimized" in a nondeterminative way. See 778 F.2d at 1323-24; Stonefield, supra note 4, at
123-34.
.
35. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
36. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs with direct evidence of discrimination
do not proceed under McDonnell Douglas. See infra Part II.
37. "At [the pretext) stage, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the case,' and
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In effect, the plaintiff has ruled out the "two most common legitimate
reasons" 38 that might explain the employer's action, and has persuaded the court that the employer, in addition, failed to act for its
stated, legitimate reason. By this process of inference, the court is able
to discern whether the employer discriminated, without requiring a
plaintiff to produce the "smoking gun" memo that would yield that
conclusion directly.
II.

OPTIONS IN THE DIRECT-EVIDENCE CASE

Direct-evidence plaintiffs, unlike those pursuing the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry, must prove that the alleged discriminatory motive
caused the adverse employment action. 39 It remains unclear, however,
how strong a causal link is required. The Supreme Court has never
clarified the precise degree of causation necessary for a successful disparate treatment claim. One oft-cited clue was provided in McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 40 In a footnote, the Court stated:
"[N]o more is required to be shown than that race was a 'but for'.
cause."41 This passage appears to make clear that plaintiffs must establish "but for" causation - that is, show that absent the discrimination, the adverse action would not have occurred.42 But in that same
footnote, the Court contradicted itself by stating that "[t]he use of the
term 'pretext' ... does not mean ... that the Title VII plaintiff must
show that he would have in any event been rejected or discharged
solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged deficiencies. "43 The Court thus suggested both that a plaintiff must show, at
minimum, "but for" causation, and that a plaintiff need not show that
the adverse action would have occurred if di~crimination alone were
'the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity,' " Le., whether the employer " 'intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 253, 255) (citations omitted). By "drops from the case," the Court meant that the employer's
articulated explanation - which was sufficient to extend the inquiry into the third stage - has
overridden the initial presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie showing. The
factfinder then determines whether the plaintiff can persuade it that the employer's explanation is
pretextual, either by showing "that the defendant more likely discriminated, or by discrediting
the explanation proffered." Note, supra note 19, at 1127 (emphasis deleted).
38. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
39. Title VII requires some causation, see sources cited in Brief for the United ·states as
Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988), but
in McDonnell Douglas cases, causation is presumed. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
40. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
41. 427 U.S. at 282 n.10.
42. Although stated as a minimum, this standard is likely a maximum, since there is little
more a plaintiff can be required to prove than "but for" causation. One more stringent approach
would be a "sole factor" test, but Title VIl's legislative history rejects such a standard. See C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 266 n.10 (1988);
Brodin, supra note 7, at 296-97.
43. 427 U.S. at 282 n.10.
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present - two positions that appear at odds.44 This confusing reference and others,45 combined with inconclusive legislative history,46
have left muddled th~ question of causation under Title VII. 47
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 48 presents the Court with an opportunity to clarify this conceptual muddle. The petitioner's main contention on appeal is that Title VII plaintiffs must show "that forbidden
discrimination was a 'but for' cause of the challenged employment decision. " 49 The respondent has countered by arguing that plaintiffs
need only prove that the decision "was caused, in part, by discrimination," and that employers can limit relief "by proving that the same
decision would have been made absent discrimination." 50
The appeals court in Hopkins classified the various lower-court approaches to direct-evidence cases according to the quantum of proof
required for the trier to conclude that a discriminatory motive was
present. 51 This Note's analysis, in contrast, focuses on the allocation
of the burden to prove causation in direct-evidence cases, and assumes
that the plaintiffs have already proven the existence of a discriminatory motive on the employer's part. Each of the approaches described
makes use of a "but for" or "same-decision" analysis. 52
44. Professor Brodin characterized this footnote of McDonald as "cryptic." Brodin, supra
note 7, at 301 n.40. The Court apparently has not expanded on it in subsequent cases. Brodin
noted in 1982 that "[s]ince McDonald, the Court has discussed the causation question only in the
quite distinct context of title VII class actions .•.." Id. at 302. And a 1989 LEXIS search did
not reveal subsequent Supreme Court references to the footnote.
45. In East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977), the Court
suggested further that it favored a "but for" inquiry. It stated: "Even assuming, arguendo, that
the company's failure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was
entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not qualified and would not have been hired in any event." This places the burden of proving "same
decision" on the defendant, but as in Mt Healthy, only after initial proof by the plaintiff of
discrimination.
46. See Brodin, supra note 7, at 294-99.
47. For extensive theoretical discussions of Title VII causation that frequently draw upon
causation theories in the tort and criminal law areas, see the amicus briefs of the United States
and the AFL-CIO in Hopkins. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 23-29 and Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-15, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S.
argued Oct. 31, 1988).
48. Price Waterhouse, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988).
49. Brief for Price Waterhouse at 21, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). This is the option described in infra Part II.A.
50. Brief of Ann B. Hopkins at 20, 31, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S.
argued Oct. 31, 1988). The respondent did not indicate whether she preferred the options set out
at infra Part 11.B. or 11.C. But she did note the importance of various kinds of nonaffirmative
relief, such as injunctions against future discrimination, see id. at 34, suggesting that she supports
the approach described at infra Part II.C.
51. The court noted that some circuits require proof of a "but for" cause, some require proof
that discrimination was a "substantial factor," and one requires proof that discrimination played
"some part." 825 F.2d at 470 n.8. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988).
52. Several commentators have criticized the result-oriented focus of these analyses. See
Stonefield, supra note 4, at 119-20; see also infra note 85.
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A. Placing the ''But For" Burden on the Plaintiff
Under this approach, the plaintiff always bears the burden of proving that discrimination was a "but for" cause of the adverse action.
The proffered direct evidence has no independent value other than
helping the plaintiff establish "but for" causation. There is no shift in
or weakening of burdens simply because the plaintiff was able to marshall direct evidence that some discrimination occurred.
The Fifth Circuit's approach is illustrative. Jack v. Texaco Researc~ Center 53 involved a discharge allegedly in retaliation for the
plaintiff's earlier exercise of Title VII-protected rights. 54 The trial
judge had found that the employer had two motives for discharging
the plaintiff: her excessive absenteeism and the proscribed retaliation.
The appeals court required the plaintiff "to prove that she would not
have been discharged absent the forbidden motive." 55 The court continued by stating that the plaintiff "must prove that, whether she was a
superb stenographer or one with serious fault, she would not have
been discharged at that time had she not complained. " 56
B. Placing the Burden on the Defendant To Prove ''Same Decision"

One attempt to avoid the potential unfairness in requiring that
plaintiffs, who already have proven that some discrimination tainted
the employer's decision, prove further that the discrimination was the
"but for" cause57 is to shift to the defendant the burden of proving
53. 743 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1984).
54. Section 704(a) of Title VII states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment .•. tiecause
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro·
ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
55. 743 F.2d at 1130.
56. 743 F.2d at 1131. See also Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F. 2d 910 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469. U.S. 892 (1984). Lewis involved claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983 by a black woman who alleged that her failure to be promoted, despite creden·
tials superior to the promoted white employee, was based on race. The employer countered that
the plaintiff had poor work habits. The court, following the Supreme Court's footnote in Mc·
Donald, concluded that a "but for" standard is appropriate, and upheld the trial court's jury
instructions which asked whether the plaintiff "would ... have been promoted ..• but for the
fact that she is black." 725 F.2d at 913. The trial judge went so far as to state that this "but for"
determination was the "polestar" around which all aspects of the case revolved, and was requisite
to a finding ofliability. 725 F.2d at 917-18. See also McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Assn. Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1068 (1988) ("[T]he employee must
establish that the discriminatory motivation was a determining factor in the challenged employment decision in that the employee would have received the job absent the discriminatory
motivation.").
57. Professor Stonefield has argued that the "but for" inquiry allows discriminating employers to escape Title VII liability. He posed a hypothetical mixed-motive scenario as one in which
an employer says to an applicant: "You don't have the necessary two years experience; you are
twenty-fifth on the list [for only three job openings]; and, besides, we already have too many
black salespeople and so we wouldn't have hired you anyway." Stonefield, supra note 4, at 93
(footnote omitted). A "but for" inquiry would absolve this employer of liability, even though the
employer has clearly acted in violation of the statute.
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that the discrimination was not the "but for" cause.'5 8 Other appeals
courts have shifted the "but for" inquiry's risk of nonpersuasion to the
defendant - in the form of a "same decision" test. By so doing, the
courts have created an affirmative defense for the employer, allowing it
to escape liability if it can prove that the same adverse decision would
have been made absent the discrimination. If the defendant prevails
on this question, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.
Mt. Healthy City School District Board ofEducation v. Doyle 59 and
its progeny embody this approach. In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 60 for example, the Court upheld an NLRB finding that
once an employee proves that a discharge was motivated, or substantially caused, by the exercise of rights protected by the National Labor
Relations Act, the employer must show that the action would have
occurred regardless of the employee's activity. 61 In so holding, the
Court accepted the NLRB's designation of this burden-shift as an "affirmative defense." 62 Several appeals courts have adopted this approach for Title VII cases. 6 3
C.

Placing the ''Same Decision" Burden on the Defendant, but
Separating Liability and Remedy

While the shift of the "but for" burden, in the form of a "same
decision" affirmative defense, removes much of the potential unfairness to plaintiffs, it also creates the possibility that employers will be
able to taint employment decisions with discrimination but still escape
liability if the discriminatory factor was not controllipg. Some courts
have sought to accommodate this possibility by separating liability and
remedy. By this approach, not only does the burden shift to the employers to prove "same decision," but the plaintiffs become entitled to
58. For a discussion of the courts' policy rationales for burden shjfting in mixed-motive
cases, see infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
Comparison of this approach to the previous one illustrates the only difference between the
"but for" and "same decision" tests. Both involve the same inquiry - speculation as to what
would have occurred absent discrimination - but the former involves burdening the plaintiff,
while the latter burdens the defendant.
·
59. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See infra Part III for a discussion of this case.
60. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
61. 462 U.S. at 400.
62. 462 U.S. at 402.
63. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987) (once plaintiff proves
discrimination is "motivating" factor, defendant must prove by preponderance of evidence that
same decision would have been made absent discrimination); Haskins v. United States Dept. of
the Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1197-98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 68 (1987) (once plaintiff
establishes that adverse decision "more likely than not" was motivated by discrimination, defendant must prove it would have taken same action absent impermissible motivation); Joshi v.
Florida State Univ. Health Center, 763 F.2d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985) (proof of discrimination creates presumption of entitlement to relief, which defendant can
rebut by proving the same decision would have been reached "absent the discrimination").
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various forms of preliminary relief when they are able to show the
presence of a discriminatory motive to some degree.
In the Eighth Circuit, for example, once the plaintiff proves that
discrimination "played some part" in the employment decision, she is
immediately entitled to a declaratory judgment, partial attorney's fees,
or an injunction. 64 Next, if the defendant fails to establish its affirmative defense - that the same decision would have been made absent
the already-proven discrimination - by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant is further liable for appropriate affirmative relief,
including reinstatement, retroactive promotion, and back pay. 65
Courts that follow this approach66 claim that it best serves two
major purposes of Title VII: eliminating all traces of discrimination
from the workplace, 67 and avoiding windfalls to plaintiffs who have
been discharged, or otherwise adversely affected, for legitimate reasons. 68 By reconciling these joint purposes, proponents claim, the appr.oach adequately deters actual or potential wrongdoers while not
placing plaintiffs in a better position than they would have been had
the violation not occurred. 6 9
64. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
65. 778 F.2d at 1324. See generally Note, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: The Eighth
Circuit's Treatment ofDual Motive Cases- Bibbs v. Block, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 941 (1986);
Note, Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases: The Eighth Circuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and
Remedy, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 155 (1986).
66. See Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1982); Fadhl v. City
& County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[I]t was proper for the district
court to find initial liability for employment discrimination without reference to whether the
[plaintifi] ultimately would have received employment •.••").
Professor Brodin's important article was the first to advocate this bifurcation of liability and
remedy. See Brodin, supra note 7, at 323-26.
67. As Professor Brodin has observed:
[Title VII] has also been reail to provide the plaintiff with an enforceable right to have
decisions regarding him made without regard to any of the forbidden criteria; or, put another way, the employer's failure to make the challenged decision without considering such
factors is itself a violation of title VII, regardless of the results of such failure.
Brodin, supra note 7, at 318 (emphasis in original). See also Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322.
68. Section 706(g) of the statute reads:
No order of the court shall require ... the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual ••. was
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination ..• in violation of [this statute].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). A plaintiff awarded affirmative relief despite losing on the "same
decision" question would receive a windfall (more relief than he deserves) and such relief would
violate the terms of this section. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322.
In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), a Title
VII case involving affirmative action, the Court held that § 706(g) does not limit relief to actual
victims of discrimination. Rather, it prevents a windfall to plaintiffs who do establish that discrimination occurred but cannot establish that the same decision would have been made absent
discrimination. 478 U.S. at 473-75. See also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561, 617-18 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. See Brodin, supra note 7, at 325.
Professor Stonefield appears to adopt this bifurcated standard in the direct-evidence case,
although he addresses the issue differently than have the courts and other commentators. He
argues that the "but for'' analysis, which is common to all three of these approaches, is underin-
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THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO MIXED-MOTIVE
CASES: MT. HEALTHY V. DOYLE

While the Supreme Court has not addressed the mixed-motive
question in a Title VII case, it has dealt with these issues in other
contexts, including employment. In Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, 70 the Court faced an employment discharge explicitly based upon mixed motives. Doyle, a public school
teacher, was discharged71 following a number of incidents, including
making offensive gestures to students, arguing with another teacher
and school cafeteria employees, and referring to some students as
"sons of bitches." Additionally, he notified a radio station about a
memorandum circulated to selected teachers regarding a faculty dress
code, and the station broadcast the content of the memorandum as a
news item. Later, the school board refused to rehire him for the next
school year. 72 In a statement explaining the reasons for the action, the
superintendent noted Doyle's "lack of tact in handling professional
matters," but went on to cite the radio station incident and the use of
obscene gestures. 73 Doyle sued, claiming the discharge was based on
the exercise of his protected right of free speech.
The Court noted initially that if the discharge was motivated solely
by Doyle's exercise of his rights, it would be unlawful, entitling him to
reinstatement. 74 Yet the Court was troubled by the fact that, as the
district court put it, "there did exist in fact reason ... independent of
any First Amendment rights or exercise thereof, to not extend tenelusive in its failure to account for discrimination that does not affect the result of the employer's
action, and requires a hopelessly difficult "counterfactual" inquiry into "what might have happened" had discrimination not been present. Stonefield, supra note 4, at 118 (emphasis in original). His solution is to focus on the employer's "substantive conduct" (i.e. whether it considered
an impermissible factor) and the plaintiff's "substantive rights" (i.e. whether discrimination
played a role in her evaluation). Id. at 122. This "allows and requires the decision-maker explicitly to evaluate all the discriminatory conduct in the case .•. and to impose liability when the
conduct is covered by the statute." Id. at 174. The bifurcated standard avoids the problems
Stonefield identifies with the "but for'' test by awarding preliminary relief upon the plaintiff's
proof of "discernible discrimination." Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322. Stonefield appears, however, to
call for a wider variety of remedies than do other advocates of the bifurcated approach: "The
eradication, deterrence and compensation purposes [of Title VII] are better served by broader
relief. The limited remedies are inadequate to compensate the injuries caused by discrimination."
Stonefield, supra note 4, at 128 n.162. See also id. at 123-34.
70. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. Actually, the school board failed to renew Doyle's contract, 429 U.S. at 282, but because
he did not hold a tenured position, the board's inaction was tantamount to a discharge.
72. 429 U.S. at 281-82.
73. 429 U.S. at 281-83, 283 n.1.
74. 429 U.S. at 283-84. This constitutional protection is the functional equivalent of the
statutory prohibitions.ofTitle VII. The Court.here effectively restated the disparate treatment
theory: if the employment action is grounded in impermissible motives, the action is illegal, and
relief is warranted.
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ure." 75 The Court's solution was to devise a two-pronged approach
designed to illustrate whether Doyle truly was victimized by an unlawful employment decision. 76 First, it required that Doyle bear the initial burden to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected,
and that the conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
employer's decision. 77 Second, it shifted the burden to the school
board to prove "that it would have reached the same decision ... even
in the absence of the protected conduct" 78 - a standard that has come
to be known as the "same decision" test. 7 9
Two considerations led to this result. One was a desire to avoid a
windfall - by insulating from discipline or discharge - to plaintiffs
who happen to engage in protected conduct yet could legitimately be
discharged for other reasons. 80 The second was a comparison of
Doyle's circumstances to criminal law cases in which confessions were
"tainted" by improper procedures, but in which convictions were upheld because the same decision would have occurred even without the
impropriety. 81
Mt. Healthy has had a great impact on, and has plainly become the
paradigm case for, analysis of mixed-motive discrimination. The
Court has applied its analytical framework to several other areas
where discriminatory motivation is at issue, most notably in unfair
75. 429 U.S. at 285, quoting unreported opinion of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio.
76. In formulating the test in Mt. Healthy, the Court did not use the term "mixed-motive."
77. 429 U.S. at 287.
78. 429 U.S. at 287. On remand, the district and appeals courts held that Doyle's contract
would not have been renewed even without the radio incident. The other incidents indicated to
those courts that, "while appellant Doyle had some fine qualities as a teacher, he also had a very
quick temper." Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir.
1982).
79. The "same decision" test is identical to the "but for'' test, which asks whether the discrimination was the "but for" cause of the adverse action. Any distinction between the two is
semantic only. A "same decision" inquiry speculatively asks whether the result would have oc·
curred had the factor not been considered; a "but for" inquiry asks whether the factor was detet·
minative in bringing about the result. See Stonefield, supra note 4, at 117-18. The Court has
recognized that the "same decision" and "but for'' tests are the same. See Givhan v. Western
Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979).
However, the two tests, at least in lower-court Title VII cases, may reflect allocation of the
burden of persuasion onto different parties, with the "same decision" test favoring the plaintiff
and the "but for'' test favoring the defendant. See supra Parts II.A. and 11.B.
80. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist explained:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved
against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought
not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his
performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply
because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its
decision.
429 U.S. at 286.
81. 429 U.S. at 286-87. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (upholding
conviction despite an arguably involuntary confession because the defendant had, in addition,
entered a voluntary guilty plea).
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labor practice cases under the National Labor Relations Act. 82 The
case's reasoning has been widely accepted by lower courts in Title VII
cases. 83 Unfortunately, when used as an analytical tool in Title VII
cases,· the notion of mixed motives only clouds the more important
issues of proof and causation that the courts must c01.ifront.
IV.

THE MIXED-MOTIVE MISNOMER

The "mixed motive" classification is unhelpful and unnecessary in
the litigation of Title VII disparate treatment claims: 84 While employment decisions, in a "real world" sense, certainly are based routinely
on more than one motive, 85 the prevailing case law illustrates that cat82. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (accepting the
NLRB's earlier adoption of Mt. Healthy as the paradigm for mixed-motive cases under the
NLRA); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1169 (1980), enforcement
granted, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
The Court has also applied Mt. Healthy to cases challenging actions by official bodies, see
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977)
(village's denial of rezoning); and to cases challenging state constitutional provisions, see Hunter
v. Underwood, 471' U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (section of Alabama Constitution disenfranchising,
among others, persons convicted of crimes "involving moral turpitude").
'
83. See infra note 87; see also Stonefield, supra note 4, at 116-17, 116-17 nn.112-16 (citing
cases); Note, An Evaluation of the Proper Standard of Causation in the Dual Motive Title VII
Context: A Rejection of the "Same Decision" Standard, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 209, 214 (1985).
The Supreme Court may soon discuss the mixed-motive issue under Title VII. See Price ,
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). The predominant questions
on appeal relate to the propriety of evidence of "sex stereotyping" to prove a Title VII violation
and to whether burden-shifting is appropriate once a plaintiff has presented some evidence of
discrimination. See Brieffor Petitioner at I; Brieffor Respondent at i; 56 U.S.L.W. 3601 (Mar.
8, 1988). This latter issue raises the mixed-motive question indirectly, since it involves the inquiry that many courts have adopted in response to the perceived uniqueness of the mixedmotive case. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
84. Although this Note's analysis is confined to Title VII, it presumably would be applicable
to mixed-motive cases arising under other statutes as well. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), for example, is closely analogous to
Title VII. See Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621 (1983).
85. There is a strong tension between acknowledging the "real world" motivations of employers and fashioning a legal regime that can account for them. As Stonefield noted, the mixedmotive case "reflects the contrast between the discrete nature of the regulatory prohibition and
the richness of human interactions.... It can rarely be said that any single stimulus is totally
responsible for a particular act; many factors normally contribute." Stonefield, supra note 4, at
113.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized this tension in connection with public decisionmaking. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitain Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1976) ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body ... made a decision
motivated solely by a single concern."); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 277 (1979) ("Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a
factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not.").
Moreover, many employment actions may involve subconscious discrimination, making a
determination of the employer's motives especially difficult. S.ee generally Brief for the American
Psychological Assn. as Amicus Curiae, at 10-20, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988) (influence of sex stereotyping on perceptions of female employees);
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing the intent requirement in equal protection analysis); Friedman,
Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Under Title VII: The Access Princi-
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egorization based on the number of motives fails to advance the crucial inquiry necessary in disparate treatment actions: determining
whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."86- Rather, the mixed-motive characterization can prevent
factfinders from focusing on the true principles of disparate treatment
theory necessary to resolve the ultimate question at issue.
When a court classifies a case as "mixed motive," it ostensibly believes that the employment action did involve the requisite clash between "good" and "bad" motives.
The courts that have created
special "tests" appropriate to the mixed-motive case have attempted to
strike a balance between the "good" motive and the "bad." Usually
following Mt. Healthy, these courts have asked: Given that the plaintiff has proven that some discrimination was present, would the employer have reached the same, adverse decision absent that
discrimination?87 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has framed the issue
as follows:
[I]n order to prove a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff need demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's decision to take
an adverse action was more likely than not motivated by a criterion proscribed by the statute. Upon such proof, the employer has the burden to
prove that the adverse employment action would have been taken even
in the absence of the impermissible motivation, and that, therefore, the
discriminatory animus was not the cause of the adverse employment
action. 88

Such a test presupposes that the plaintiff has proven a threshold level
of discrimination. Indeed, any formulation of what constitutes an acpie, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 41, 44 (arguing that Title VII should ensure that minorities are not
"deprived of meaningful access to employment opportunities"); Welch, supra note 11, at 752
("Only a framework which attacks the routine, unreflective reliance on prejudice in employment
decisions will remove discriminatory barriers."); Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form ofEmployment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345 (1980); Comment,
Help Wanted: An Expansive Definition of Constructive Discharge Under Title Vil 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 941 (1988) (discussing forms of unconscious workplace discrimination).
86. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983), quoting Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980). In the quoted passage, the Court
apparently meant to limit its conclusion to disparate treatment cases, where intentional discrimination is at issue, although it did not say so. Disparate impact cases do not require intent. See
supra note 5.
Despite the language of intent in cases like Burdine and Aikens, the Court's approach to
disparate treatment has been motive-based rather than intent-based. When the Court defines the
term "intentionally discriminated," it cites passages that speak only of treating people differently,
not acting with a conscious purpose. See Welch, supra note 11, at 771; see generally supra note
30. But see Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2633 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("A disparate treatment claim ... requires proof of a discriminatory·
purpose. Of course, • "[d]iscriminatory purpose" implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences.' It implies that the challenged action was taken 'at least in part
"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.'.") (citations
omitted).
87. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985); Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
88. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985).
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tion based on "mixed" motives must assume that at least some discrimination was present, for without that primary determination,
there is nothing for the permissible motive to counter. 89
Before finding a discriminatory motive in mixed-motive cases,
though, a court first must have weighed the parties' evidence. A plaintiff would not assert mixed motives in the pleadings; to do so would
dilute the claim that the employment action was taken "because of"
an illegal factor. Similarly, an employer would not initially ask the
court to use a mixed-motive analysis, because to do so would concede
that at least some discrimination was present. 90 If the court were to be
fully persuaded by either side's case - either the plaintiff's argument
that a discriminatory motive was relied on or the defendant's argument that only permissible factors were present - the court's resolution of the facts would be simple: enter judgment (perhaps summary
judgment) for the party with the more compelling evidence. But when
a case proceeds beyond the summary judgment stage and the court
concludes that mixed motives were involved, the court implicitly concedes that the resolution of the facts is not so easy - it is somewhat
convinced by the explanations of each side. In this way, "mixed-motive" cases simply represent the difficult cases. Any "single" motive
case is so deemed because the court finds the evidence on one side to
be especially compelling, and therefore conclusive. Indeed, employers
will rarely, if ever, remain silent in the face of a nonfrivolous Title VII
claim. Since even the most egregious violators surely can fashion
some legitimate reason explaining their action, every case is potentially
a mixed-motive case, pitting the plaintiff's asserted discriminatory reason(s) against the employer's asserted legitimate one(s). As the Solicitor General argued in Hopkins:
Congress recognized that virtually every disparate treatment case will to
some degree entail multiple causes. Thus, if the elements of Title VII
liability or the burden of persuasion differs depending on the "proper"
categorization of a case as involving either mixed or single motives, the
predictable result will be pointless litigation over what label should
be affixed to cases, rather than on the ultimate question [of
discrimination]. 91
89. This conclusion is apparent given the various definitions of the mixed-motive case. See
supra note 7. The AFL-CIO has argued that the link between discriminatory motivation and the
employer's decision is "almost always self-evident" in mixed-motive cases, "since the discriminatory evaluation process is by definition one made discriminatory by the very fact that the employer took or is taking sex-based considerations into account and is giving those considerations a
negative weight in its decisionmaking." Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 15, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988) (emphasis in original).
90. "[A] case becomes one of mixed motivation not because a plaintiff or defendant characterizes it that way - but rather because the trier of fact determines that both lawful and unlawful motives contributed to an employment decision." Brief for Respondent at 31 n.15, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988).
91. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No.
87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988) (emphasis in original).

880

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:863

In its attempts to apply a mixed-motive analysis in non-Title VII
contexts, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that resort to a mixedmotive analysis reflects a concession that the presented facts do not
lean strongly in either party's favor. For example, in Hunter v. Underwood, 92 the Court faced an 84-year-old provision of the Alabama constitution that, the appellees alleged, had been enacted out of a desire to
disenfranchise blacks. 93 The Court first noted the established constitutional doctrine that legislative "action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 94 Concluding that the provision was plainly grounded in discriminatory
motives,95 the Court nonetheless acknowledged the state's assertion
that disenfranchisement of poor whites was a "parallel" motivation96
- apparently a problem of mixed motives. 97 Yet the Court found the
evidence of impermissible motivation to be so compelling - aided by,
for example, powerful expert testimony at trial, 98 and the state counsel's concession at oral argument that "I would be very blind and naive [to] ... say that race was not a factor in the enactment of [s]ection
182 " 99 - that it held race to be a "but for" cause of the provision
without doing the mixed-motive analysis that it said the case would
require. 100
92. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
93. At issue was Article VIII, section 182 of the Alabama constitution, which disenfranchised persons convicted of, among other crimes, "any infamous crime or crime involving
moral turpitude." 471 U.S. at 223 n.*.
94. 471 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)).
95. "[The court of appeals'] opinion presents a thorough analysis of the evidence and demonstrates conclusively that § 182 was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks." 471 U.S.
at 229.
96. "[A]ppellants make the further argument that the existence of a permissible motive for
§ 182, namely, the disenfranchisement of poor whites, trumps any proof of a parallel impermissible motive." 471 U.S. at 231-32.
97. Although the Court did not use the term "mixed motives," it favorably quoted the court
of appeals' opinion from below, which did use the term. 471 U.S. at 225 (quoting 730 F.2d 614,
617 (11th Cir. 1984)).
98. 471 U.S. at 230-31.
99. 471 U.S. at 230.
100. At one point, the Court stated that ''Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the
proper analysis" for resolving the case. 471 U.S. at 232. Nevertheless, the Court refused to
follow the reasoning of those cases, which call for a "same decision" analysis, stating: "[A]n
additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to
discriminate against all blacks, and it is beyond peradventure that the latter was a 'but-for' motivation for the enactment of§ 182." 471 U.S. at 232. Apparently the strength of the appellee's
evidence made the "but-for" determination "beyond peradventure" and made the mixed-motive
aspect of the case irrelevant.
Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). At
issue in that case was the village's denial of a proposed rezoning that would have allowed the
respondents to build integrated housing facilities. The evidence of discriminatory motivation
there was so weak - the respondents had "simply failed to carry their burden of proving that
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In Mt. Healthy, the paradigm mixed-motive case, the evidence of
both permissible and impermissible motivation was compelling. The
superintendent's memo explicitly stated that both the teacher's "notable lack of tact" and his report to the radio station led to his dismissal.101 Unlike Hunter, the evidence of the controlling motivation was
not conclusive either way, and the Court, confronted with the evidentiary conflict, devised the "same decision" test to glean the impact of
the discriminatory factor on the discharge. 102
Lower courts have engaged in similar evidence-weighing in Title
VII mixed-motive cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has recognized this, stating in one case that because the plaintiff "did
not establish that race was a discernible factor in the school district's
refusal to hire her, this is not a mixed motive case." 103 Similarly, the
D.C. Circuit has stated that the mixed-motive "test'~ comes into play
only when the plaintiff "has already discharged [the] burden of demonstrating that the employment decision was based on impermissible
bias." 104
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision," 429 U.S. at 270- that
the Court did not find mixed motives despite acknowledging the difficulty of discerning legislative motivation. 429 U.S. at 268-71. As in Hunter, the Court might easily have found mixed
motives ifthe plaintiff's evidence had been stronger. Instead, the Court was left to speculate that
had such evidence existed, then it would have followed a mixed-motive analysis:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory
purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such
proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered...•
See ML Healthy ....
429 U.S. at 271 n.21 (citation omitted).
101. ML Healthy. 429 U.S. at 283 n.l.
102. The National Labor Relations.Board recognized the derivative nature of the "mixedmotive" label when it adopted ML Healthy for unfair labor practices cases. It noted that "the
distinction between a [single-motive] case and a dual motive case is sometimes difficult to discern.•.. [It] seldom can be made until after the presentation of all relevant evidence." Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1170 n.5 (1980) (emphasis added). Further, the
distinction between single- and mixed-motive cases depends on the court's assessment of the
relative weight accorded to the evidence. The Board continued: "[I]n a [single-motive] situation,
the employer's affirmative defense of business justification [i.e., its legitimate reason] is wholly
without meriL If, however, the affirmative defense has at least some merit a "dual motive" may
exist.... " 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 n.5 (emphasis added).
103. Boudreaux v. Helena-West Helena School Dist., 819 F.2d 854, 856 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987).
See also Powell v. Missouri State Highway & Transp. Dept., 822 F.2d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1987)
(finding the facts not to, involve mixed motives because plaintiff did not establish "that race
played any part in the decision"); Crutchfield v. Maverick Tube Corp., 664 F.Supp. 455, 458
(E.D.Mo. 1987) ("The Court finds that sex played no part in plaintiff's discharge and, therefore,
the mixed motive analysis is inappropriate.").
104. 825 F.2d at 471. The Hopkins case starkly presents the evidence-weighing prerequisite
of the mixed-motive categorization. The court reached its i~termediate conclusion that discrimination played a role in the plaintiff's partnership evaluation by accepting her evidence, aided by
expert testimony, that sex-stereotyping permeated the partners' assessment of her candidacy. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant questioned the sufficiency of that initial evidence,
arguing that "this case should never have been characterized as a 'mixed motives' case at all.
Here, the only indication of the existence of 'mixed motives' was the gossamer evidence provided
by [the plaintiff's expert] who purported to find stereotyping in some of the expressions used ...
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When viewed in light of the evidence-weighing that mixed-motive
cases embody, the analytical framework provided by a mixed-motive
approach becomes little more than a way for courts to restate, in convenient terms, their version of the proper test of Title VII causation.
The issue for courts in mixed-motive cases is: given the presence, at
least in some degree, of a discriminatory motive, is the nexus between
that motive and the employer's actual decision strong enough to impose Title VII liability? But the inquiry devised for these cases whether termed as a "same decision" test or its equivalent, the "but
for" test 105 - is simply a statement of the standard for Title VII causation in general. It reflects one way of applying the statute's prohibition on employment actions taken "because of" or "on the basis of"
discrimination. Indeed, the same-decision analysis takes no explicit
account of any legitimate motive on the employer's part whatsoever.
It focuses only on the alleged impermissible reason and whether the
same decision would have been reached if that reason was not present.
Before courts can reach this causation question, they must resolve
the question of proof: did the plaintiff show that a discriminatory motive existed? By implying that the employer's legitimate motive is of
equal doctrinal concern as the illegitimate one, the "mixed motive"
label unnecessarily diverts attention from the logical progression from
proof to causation: the question of whether the presence of a discriminatory motive has been proved precedes the question of whether that
motive, once it has been proved, was the but-for cause of the employer's action. A more useful approach than the mixed-motive analysis is to characterize cases on the questions that present themselves at
the first stage of that progression: was a discriminatory motive present, and does the plaintiff seek to prove it by direct or indirect
evidence?
V. THE DIRECT/INDIRECT EVIDENCE DISTINCTION

A.

The Requirement of Direct Evidence

A court's determination that a given case involves "mixed" motives reflects an underlying acknowledgement that the plaintiff has
proven discrimination by direct evidence. Specifically, the theory of a
mixed-motive case - that the employment action was the product of
both permissible and impermissible factors - assumes that the court
has reached an intermediate conclusion that some discrimination, in
whatever degree, 106 was present. That conclusion must be reached by
in the written evaluations of [the plaintiff's] performance." Brief for Petitioner at 20, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988).
105. See supra note 100.
106. It is uncertain precisely how much discrimination the plaintiff must show to satisfy the
initial proof hurdle. The Eighth Circuit requires that the plaintiff show that discrimination
played a "discernible part" in the employer's decision. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th
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direct evidence.
Title VII plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment can proceed j.n one
of two ways: by presenting indirect evidence and using the threetiered route of McDonnell Douglas, or, alternately, by presenting direct evidence. While McDonnell Douglas is the more widely used
analysis, 107 it is inappropriate when the plaintiff presents direct evidence. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 108 the Supreme
Court made clear that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. The
shifting burdens of proof ... are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff
[has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.' " 109
This conclusion is compelled by the underlying policy of the threestage inferential process: the test is appropriate when only circumstantial evidence is available. "It would be illogical, indeed ironic, to
hold a Title VII plaintiff presenting direct evidence of a defendant's
intent to discriminate to a more stringent burden of proof, or to allow
a defendant to meet that direct proof by merely articulating, but not
proving, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action." 110
While it is recognized that the McDonnell Douglas approach is not
appropriate when the plaintiff proceeds by direct evidence, 111 it should
Cir. 1985) (en bane). Other circuits have required a showing that discrimination was a "significant" or "substantial" factor. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n.9 (11th Cir.
1985); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984); Whiting v.
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,
825 F.2d 458, 470 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 s. Ct. 1106 (1988); 1 c. SULLIVAN, M.
ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 266-67 (2d ed. 1988); Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued
Oct. 31, 1988).
107. See supra note 19.
108. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
109. Id. at 121 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)). For a critique of Thurston and an argument that McDonnell Douglas
and direct evidence can be reconciled, see Edwards, supra note 10, at 1-4, 32-35.
110. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
The inapplicability of McDonnell Douglas in direct-evidence cases is well noted by the courts
and commentators. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987), and cases
cited therein; 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, at§ 50.62 at 10-70 ("The plaintiff's
proof by means of direct evidence does not merely fulfill his burden of showing a prima facie
case; it suffices to make his entire case and throws the burden on the defendant of proving, at
least by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have rejected the plaintiff even in the
absence of discrimination.") (footnotes omitted); cases cited in B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 4, at 297 n.5 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1985); Brief for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
as Amicus Curiae at 50 n.40, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31,
1988).
111. The Court in Thurston did not provide a definition of "direct evidence." But it is plausible that the Court adopted the same view as this Note: direct evidence is defined as evidence of
the employer's intent sufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude that "the employer intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff," see supra note 11, if the employer were to remain silent in the
face of it. The Court might also have intended a tautological explanation: direct evidence is that
which makes invocation of the McDonnell Douglas framework unnecessary, since the plaintiff
has access to evidence adequate to make a case of discrimination. Thurston itself, decided under
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also be recognized that the approach is equally incompatible with
"mixed motives." The three-stage inferential inquiry is a process of
elimination: the plaintiff, at stage I, rules out "the two most common"
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action; 112 the employer, at stage II, provides one or several legitimate reasons for the
job action; and the plaintiff, at stage III, attempts to prove that the
stage II reasons advanced by the employer are false. 113 But in a
mixed-motive case, the employer's explanation must by definition be
accepted as true; further, an impermissible explanation must be present and accepted as true. The actual reason for the employer's action
in a mixed-motive case is the combination of both explanations. A
McDonnell Douglas, single-motive case, on the other hand, recognizes
that if the employer's articulated explanation were true, the employer
would win, and an inference of discrimination from the ruling-out of
legitimate reasoµs would be untenable. 114 Instead, the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry requires the plaintiff to show that "all legitimate reasons . . . have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's
actions." 115
Some courts have incorrectly suggested that it is possible to follow
the McDonnell Douglas inquiry and still reach a conclusion of "mixed
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982), involved an airline's
policy of mandatory retirement for cockpit employees at age 60. Discrimination in such a scenario clearly is proven by direct evidence, since the policy facially discriminates on the basis of age.
In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, decided four years before Thurston, the
Court said that a plaintiff could attempt to prove pretext under the McDonnell Douglas inquiry
"either directly •.. or indirectly." 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Given the subsequent statement in
Thurston, the Court could not here have been referring to direct evidence, but rather to a plaintiff's means of disputing the employer's legitimate explanation and thereby strengthening the
circumstantial inference the plaintiff created with the prima facie case. The plaintiff may use
circumstantial evidence either directly by showing discriminatory intent or indirectly by showing
that the employer's explanation is unpersuasive. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. The two reasons are that the plaintiff is unqualified and the position is unavailable.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
113. When a plaintiff proves pretext "indirectly,'' as suggested in Burdine, see supra note 111,
she cancels out the employer's explanation - and thereby sustains the burden of persuading the
court that the employer intentionally discriminated - expressly, "by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 450 U.S. at 256. When she does so
"directly," she cancels out the explanation by showing that the employer did not likely act for
that reason, such that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer." 450 U.S. at
256. This latter tack builds one circumstantial inference atop another: the prima facie case
allows the court to infer discrimination, and the plaintiff's rebuttal allows the court to infer that
the employer's response is untrue.
114. As Justice Blackmun recognized, "[T]he McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a
plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment
decision." United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 718 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Note, supra note 19, at 1121 ("[D]isproof of the defendant's
explanation entitles the plaintiff to prevail by a process of elimination."). In effect, then, the
McDonnell Douglas inquiry does not require any evidence of discrimination other than the employment action itself and the employer's failure to explain it credibly.
115. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added). The
Fumco Court also stated: "A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
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motives." 116 A court might, for example, find the employer's explanation less than compelling on its face, but also find that the plaintiff has
failed to discredit the explanation adequately. 117 In such a case, the
temptation may be to conclude that each party is partially correct and
that mixed motives are present: the circumstantial evidence is compelling, while the legitimate explanation is credible, though weak. Courts
that adopt such a posture misconstrue the McDonnell Douglas framework. That framework is not meant to weaken the burden that a
plaintiff must bear to convince the court that intentional discrimination. took place; rather, it exists to facilitate the plaintiff's proof of her
case given the likelihood that she will be unable to obtain direct evidence of intent. 118 Although McDonnell Douglas makes an indirectevidence plaintiff's procedural hurdles less onerous, it still requires
that the plaintiff ultimately persuade the court that intentional discrimination occurred. 119 Where a plaintiff has inadequately proven
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 438 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
Professor Brodin has provided a similar explanation for McDonnell Douglas' limitation to the
single-motive scenario:
.
Put in terms of the pretext analysis, the mixed-motive causation problem arises when a
challenged personnel decision was motivated by both pretextual (unlawful) and nonpretextual (lawful) reasons.... It would appear, however, that the pretext approach is based on an
assumption of single-motive decisionmaking, with the employer seeking to cover up an unlawful motive with one or a number of lawful reasons which are not the true reasons behind
the action. If the employer's' stated reasons are shown to be pretext, then in fact there is no
real dual motive - there is only the unlawful motive.
Brodin, supra note 7, at 301. n.40.
116. An example of this is the recent analysis by the Second Circuit suggesting that plaintiffs
can prove by a McDonnell Douglas inquiry the initial discrimination required for a mixed-motive
analysis.
When plaintiffs win, the only difference between a dual motive case and a simple McDonnell
Douglas case is that in the former case the fact-finder has concluded that the improper
reason has been proved to exist . • . to a degree sufficient to warrant a finding that the
improper reason was a substantial cause of the adverse action.
Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988). This statement fails to
acknowledge that McDonnell Douglas is inconsistent with a mixed-motives analysis. See supra
notes 111-15 and accompanying text. It also appears to rely on the false premise that plaintiffs
can only prove discrimination through McDonnell Douglas - ignoring the possibility of direct
evidence of discrimination: "[T]he fact-finder who concludes a case by applying [a mixed-motive
analysis] will have already found ... that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving the
existence of an improper reason for the adverse action. In such circumstances, the case is really
an application of both McDonnell Douglas and Mt. Healthy." 839 F.2d at 878. But see 839 F.2d
at 878 n.6 (factfinder could apply mixed-motive analysis without requiring an initial McDonnell
Douglas finding if it "assume[s]" that the improper rea5on exists).
117. For example, a plaintiff might present a solid prima facie case that his discharge was
racially motivated, which the employer could rebut by articulating that the plaintiff had poor
work habits and was insubordinate. The plaintiff may be unable to persuade the court that these
explanations are pretextual, but might also bring to bear evidence of a supervisor's occasional
inquiries about the plaintiff's involvement in a local civil rights organization.
118. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. See also Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) ("In a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens
and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.").
119. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
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pretext, even if the prima facie presumption is strong and the employer's explanation weak, the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden
of persuasion and should lose. 12 Courts that label such a case one of
"mixed motives" improperly apply the McDonnell Douglas inquiry
and grant to plaintiffs a favor the Court never intended. 121 Further, by
imposing a shift of the burden of persuasion to the defendant in such
cases - where the plaintiff has proven the initial discrimination by a
McDonnell Douglas inference - courts ignore the defendant's almost
de minimus burden merely to "articulate" a legitimate explanation. In
effect, these courts find the requisite discrimination for a mixed-motive
analysis from the defendant's failure to persuade the court that the
nondiscriminatory reason is true, an unfair imposition under Burdine.
Indeed, the Court itself has rejected the view that the indirect-evidence
approach might apply to a mixed-motive scenario.1 22

°

discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. The McDonnell Douglas
division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted).
120. The defendant's stage II burden only to "articulate" - and not to "prove" or "persuade" - a nondiscriminatory explanation compels this conclusion. McDonnell Douglas re·
quires only that the defendant state a reason in response to the presumption raised at stage I:
"The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact ••••" Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254 (citation omitted). See also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978)
(per curiam). A mixed-motive analysis assumes that the defendant's proffered reason is proven
and in fact partially explains why it made the challenged decision.
121. In the above example, see supra note 117, the plaintiff's failure to rebut adequately the
employer's articulated explanations means that he has failed to carry the burden of persuasion,
and should not prevail. The direct evidence (of the supervisor's inquiries), however, may be
adequate to support a direct-evidence inquiry and prove the existence of some discrimination,
which would make a determination about causation appropriate. It is essential, though, that the
court keep separate the direct- and indirect-evidence inquiries. Because these inquiries reflect
only the court's analytic models for evaluating the evidence, and not procedural roadmaps for
the progression of trial, the court can consider all the evidence presented and then determine
which inquiry is appropriate, given the nature of that evidence.
122. In NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., the Court noted that Burdine "discussed only
the situation in which the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the
'true' motives behind the decision." 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1982) (emphasis added).
However, the Court provided one caveat. In McDonnell Douglas it stated that the inquiry is
flexible and should be adapted to varying fact patterns. ''The facts necessarily will vary in Title
VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof required • • • is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
It is apparent, however, that this caveat applies only to the Court's description of the requirements for a stage I prima facie case. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, appended the footnoted caveat after listing the prima facie requirements, not after describing the larger three-stage
inquiry. See 411 U.S. at 802. Furthermore, in Burdine, where Justice Powell repeated the stage I
requirements, he stated that "this standard is not inflexible" and then quoted the McDonnell
Douglas caveat. 450 U.S. at 253 n.6 (emphasis added). See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) ("The prima facie case method established in
McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.' ") (emphasis added). Thus, the Court intended that the tripartite analysis shoul~ be applicable to contexts other
than the racial, failure-to-hire 'Situation presented by the facts of McDonnell Douglas. Subsequent application of McDonnell Douglas by the Supreme Court and lower courts bears this explanation out. See supra note 20.
Moreover, the refusal of some lower courts to follow a rigid, three-step procedure in McDon·
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In direct-evidence cases, by contrast, it is possible to consider any
number of motivating factors without contradicting the theory on
which the plaintiff's case is predicated. The court's analysis is more
straightforward than in the three-stage process because it simply
weighs the evidence presented by each party. If the court is persuaded
that the motivations advanced by both sides contributed to the decision, the case becomes a "mixed-motive" case. The crucial difference
between this and an indirect-evidence, single-motive case is the ability
of the court to find that multiple motives did exist - a finding not
possible with an inferential inquiry.
The shifts in burdens of persuasion devised by courts for use in
mixed-motive cases illustrate the necessity of direct evidence for a
"mixed-motive" designation. Close examination of these cases reveals
that the courts are concerned not with a conflict in motives, but with
attaining results consistent with their views of the policies of Title VII:
imposing a sanction on the employer that has engaged in wrongdoing
without providing a windfall of relief for the victimized plaintiff. In
Transportation Management, for example, the Court explained that
once a plaintiff establishes that some discrimination has occurred, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to punish it for its impermissible behavior:
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he
knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing. 123

Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reasoned that
once the plaintiff has established that discrimination played a role in
ne// Douglas disparate treatment cases, see, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277,
1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977) ("McDonne// Douglas does not require a three-step judicial minuet of
procedure under which the defendant must come forward with evidence if certain facts in plaintiff's case establish a prima facie case ...."), likely stems from a recognition that the McDonne//
Douglas inquiry simply aids the court's consideration of the evidence. The trial does not proceed
in the trifurcated fashion that the formula suggests. Rather, the plaintiff, in the case-in-chief,
presents all her evidence initially, including rebuttal of the defendant's anticipated legitimate
explanations. See Note, supra note 19, at 1119 n.39 ("McDonne// Douglas prescribed an analytical rather than a procedural framework,'' and "does not contemplate a trifurcated trial.").
123. 462 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). The Court accepted the Board's construction of the
employer's burden as an affirmative defense. "The Board has ..• chosen to recognize .•. what it
designates as an affirmative defense that the employer has the burden of sustaining. We are
unprepared to hold that this is an impermissible construction of the [National Labor Relations]
Act." 462 U.S. at 402.
Several lower courts, applying this reasoning to Title VII, have also imposed the burden of
persuasion on the defendant to prove that the same decision would have been made absent discrimination. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Black, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) ("[T]he
burden of production and persuasion shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant.") (emphasis in
original); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen a plaintiff has proved
by direct evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment decision, the burden is on the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same
decision would have been made absent the discrimination.").
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the employment action, "it is unreasonable and destructive of the purposes of Title VII to require the plaintiff to establish in addition the
difficult hypothetical proposition that, had there been no discrimination, the employment decision would have been made in his favor." 124
These courts have also noted that even if the plaintiff has already
proved the existence of discrimination, she should not be awarded a
windfall if the discrimination was not the controlling factor in the employer's decision. 125 The shifting burdens of the mixed-motive inquiry
are thus premised on twin concerns: burdening an employer that has,
to some extent, considered illegal factors; and avoiding unjust enrichment to a plaintiff who, despite some discrimination, has not been
truly "victimized" because the adverse action would have been taken
anyway. 126 These concerns only arise, of course, if the plaintiff has
first presented, by direct evidence, proof that the employer did consider the asserted illegal factors.
In lower-court "mixed-motive" cases, the presence of direct evidence is apparent. In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 127 for instance, the
plaintiff pointed to numerous internal memoranda and statements by
the employer indicating stereotypical attitudes toward the plaintiff, if
not outright aex discrimination. 128 Similarly, in Mt. Healthy, the superintendent told the plaintiff that the constitutionally protected activity was a partial reason for the discharge. 129 These courts were able to
label the cases "mixed-motive" because of the plaintiffs' initial ability
124. Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court in Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse relied on this aspect of the Toney case. 825 F.2d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
125. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86; Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322 ("Unless the impermissible racial motivation was a but-for cause ofBibbs's losing the promotion, to place him in the
job now would award him a windfall.").
126. It is not necessary to view "victimization" under Title VII in this result-oriented fashion. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
127. 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, (1988).
128. The trial court in Hopkins credited, and the appeals court accepted, evidence that the
head of the plaintiff's division - her "most fervent supporter" - suggested that the firm would
view the plaintiff's candidacy for partnership more favorably if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry." 825 F.2d at 463. The court of appeals later stated that the plaintiff had "shown
by direct evidence" that unlawful discrimination existed, and that "this crucial finding justifies
the burden-shifting rule we apply in this case." 825 F.2d at 471 n.9 (emphasis added).
One issue before the Supreme Court in Hopkins is the probative value of evidence of "sex
stereotyping" to prove sex discrimination under Title VII. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 24-26; Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae.
129. The memo explaining the discharge pointed to Doyle's improper behavior at the school
and his "leak" to the radio station. See 429 U.S. at 283 n.1.
Other mixed-motive cases also reveal direct evidence. In Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320
(8th Cir. 1985) (en bane), the court found that the key member of the committee evaluating the
plaintiff for promotion had referred to the plaintiff as a "black militant" and to another black
employee as "boy" and "nigger." In NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 396
(1983), the complainant's supervisor, upon discovering that the complainant sought to encourage
his co-workers to join the Teamsters, "referred to [him] as two-faced, and promised to get even
with him," and later a5ked a co-worker, "What's with Sam and the Union?" 462 U.S. at 396.
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to present credible direct evidence of discrimination. Only after crediting the plaintiffs' evidence did the courts address the problems raised
by the presence of conflicting motives by shifting the intermediate burden to the defendant and imposing a "same decision" test of causation
to assess the impact of the impermissible motive.
B.

Workability of the Direct/Indirect Evidence Distinction

The distinction between cases involving direct evidence and those
involving indirect evidence, already recognized in Title VII case
law, 130 should be the central method of analysis in disparate treatment
adjudication. By focusing on the type of evidence the plaintiff
presents, rather than the number of motives, courts can avoid the doctrinal clutter that the "mixed motive" label creates. This approach
rejects the concern with the quantity of motives and forces courts to
focus on the crucial, but distinct, inquiries into the proof of illicit motives and whether those motives played a causal role in the challenged
employment action.
Under this approach, the court should, at the initial proof inquiry,
consider the character of the evidence to determine whether it is direct
or indirect, and then consider whether the discriminatory motive, if
shown, caused the employment action. 131 If the plaintiff relies on indirect evidence, a court will follow the McDonnell Douglas framework at
the proof stage, and a subsequent causation inquiry will be unnecessary. If a plaintiff prevails under McDonnell Douglas, and successfully
persuades the court that the employer's asserted reasons were pretextual, the factfinder concludes, ipso facto, that the employer intentionally discriminated, and that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. No
separate inquiry into causation is required; it is assuµied. 132 But if,
instead, the plaintiff relies on credible direct evidence, the court should
then proceed to a causation inquiry.133
130. See supra Part V.A.
131. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. On the various approaches to the causation inquiry, see supra Part II.
132. "The very showing that the defendant's asserted reason was a pretext for race is also a
demonstration that but for his race plaintiff would have gotten the job: That is what pretext
means: a reason/or the employment decision that is not the true reason." Bibbs v. Block, 778
F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis in original).
133. It is unclear exactly how "direct" the direct evidence must be for the court to employ
the direct-evidence approach rather than the McDonnell Douglas approach. In its amicus brief in
Hopkins, the United States argued that "a rule that required the burden of proof on causation to
shift to the defendant would present severe problems in defining the 'threshold' showing that the
plaintiff would have to make before such a shift would take place." Brieffor the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 20, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. Argued Oct. 31, 1988).
The parties in Hopkins are in fundamental disagreement about whether the plaintiff's evidence
meets that threshold. Compare Brief for the Petitioner at 4-15 with Brief for the Respondent at
2-12.
The approach embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence seems most appropriate. See FED.
R. Ev10. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less prob-
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This process makes an intermediate finding of "mixed motives"
irrelevant. It takes no account of the quantity of the employer's motives, but looks instead to the instrumental issues of whether a discriminatory motive was present, and if so, what effect this motive had on
the employer's decision. 134 As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, which
has already explicitly embraced this process:
[T]he McDonnell Douglas method of proving a prima facie case pertains
primarily, if not exclusively, to situations where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking. . . . If the evidence consists of direct testimony
that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, and the trier of
fact accepts this testimony, the ultimate issue of discrimination is
proved.... "[D]efendant can rebut only by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the same decision would have been reached even
absent the presence of that factor."135
Althoug~ the case factually involved multiple motives, 136 the notion of
able than it would be without the evidence."); FED. R. Evm. 402 ("All relevant evidence is
admissible ... , Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
For example, a plaintiff might claim that an interviewer's arguably racist joke is adequate
direct evidence that her rejection was based on discrimination. The court needs only to make a
threshold determination whether the evidence of such a joke makes the "fact of consequence" discrimination - more or less probable. If, in the course of trial, such evidence is discredited
(say, by proof that the joke was never made), the direct-evidence aspect of the plaintiff's case is
lost. The plaintiff then may either present other direct evidence (or risk a directed verdict for the
defendant), or resort to the indirect-evidence approach of McDonnell Douglas. It is important,
however, that the court not combine the two approaches, since their tenets are inconsistent. See
supra notes 106-29 and accompanying text.
·
Statistical evidence, although rarely advanced by an individual disparate treatment plaintiff,
defies easy characterization as either indirect or direct evidence. On the one hand, statistics, like
indirect evidence, help create the requisite inference of discrimination. For example, if a plaintiff
has established a prima facie case of race discrimination, evidence that an employer's work force
is 99 percent white may create a sufficiently strong inference of wrongdoing that no articulated
explanation by the employer will be believed. The statistics would support the circumstantial
inference and would be the "direct" proof of pretext at stage III of which the Burdine Court
spoke. See supra note 111; see also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 316-17 (2d ed.
Cum. Supp. 1985) (characterizing statistics as "circumstantial evidence.").
On the other hand, statistical evidence is like direct evidence because, if believed, it helps
resolve a matter in issue. See supra note 11. The statistical proof would certainly not be conclusive direct evidence that a particular plaintiff suffered discrimination, but would, like a racist joke
during an interview, directly support the proposition that discrimination was involved in the
assessment of this plaintiff. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978)
(stating that although Title VII requires that each applicant be treated nondiscriminatorily, regardless of the composition of the current work force, statistical proof is "not wholly irrelevant"
to the issue of the employer's intent in an individual disparate treatment case). The question of
the proper classification of statistical proof may be academic, however, since it appears that few
individual disparate treatment plaintiffs rely on statistics. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 4, at 1331 (statistics are crucial in disparate impact cases and disparate treatment class
actions).
134. It is crucial to recognize that a Title VII trial proceeds as does any other civil trial. The
analytical frameworks under discussion simply guide the court in its factfinding and application
of the law to the facts of each case.
135. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1204 (1984) (quoting Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th
Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in original); see also 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, at§ 50.62
(1987).
136. The trial court credited evidence that the first employee assigned to a newly posted job
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"mixed motives" never entered the court's reasoning. Rather, the
court placed the facts under the rubric of direct evidence, and from
there applied its particular test of Title VII causation, expressly rejecting the trial court's use of the McDonnell Douglas formula. 137
Many courts, however, have become bogged down in mixed-motive terminology without recognizing that the true basis for distinguishing the mixed-motive case is evidentiary. For example, the
Eighth Circuit, which has given perhaps more attention to the mixedmotive issue than any court, 138 applies a mixed-motive, burden-shifting analysis whenever the plaintiff can show a "discernible" level of
discrimination, 139 but ignores how a plaintiff might show that "discernible" level. Another court has suggested that plaintiffs can offer
"direct proof of discrimination, circumstantial proof of discrimination
or proof of mixed motivation." 140
Much of the confusion attendant to the mixed-motive cases can be
traced to the failure to recognize the direct/indirect evidence distinction. In indirect-evidence cases, defendants, in presenting their cases,
often will advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation without clarifying whether that reason was the sole, or simply an additional, reason for their action. Presumably, plaintiffs are similarly
ambiguous in their own case-in-chief. The choice is left to the court:
if it perceives the alleged discriminatory reason to be the sole reason, it
will apply McDonnell Douglas, but if it perceives the issue to be
in the plant washroom was more qualified than the plaintiff (a legitimate reason) but also credited
evidence of a statement by a supervisor that if the plaintiff, a woman, were assigned to the job,
then "every woman in the plant would want to go into the washroom." 715 F.2d at 1553-54.
137. 715 F.2d at 1556-57. For a critique of Bell, see Edwards, supra note 10, at 17-31.
Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987), takes a similar approach. Fields involved
the denial of tenure to a faculty member. The trial court found that the plaintiff's department
"was generally permeated with sexual discrimination of which the plaintiff was in fact a victim,''
but also found that the plaintiff had serious teaching deficiencies. 817 F.2d at 933. The court of
appeals held that "when a plaintiff has proved by direct evidence that unlawful discrimination
was a motivating factor in an employment decision, the burden is on the employer to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made absent the discrimination." 817 F.2d at 937.
138. The court granted an en bane hearing in Bibbs expressly to revisit the mixed-motive
question, and the en bane decision's five separate opinions reflect a sharp divergence of views on
the issue. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
139. 778 F.2d at 1322.
140. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 864 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 495
(1987) (emphasis added). Opinions in other circuits betray a similar confusion. For example, in
Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741F.2d1163 (9th Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit noted that an employer may be liable upon a plaintiff's proof that discrimination was "a significant factor" in the decision, but neglects to mention the means by which a
plaintiff would make that proof. It referred only to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of cases,
suggesting that no alternative method of proof under Title VII existed. 741 F.2d at 1166. In
addition, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Goostree v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987), suggested that three kinds of cases exist
under Title VII: McDonnell Douglas, "a dual motive case or a case in which direct evidence of
discrimination is available." 796 F.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
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whether the alleged reason was the "but for" reason, it will apply a
Mt. Healthy mixed-motive analysis. 141 Quantifying motives is both
difficult and confusing.
If a plain distinction is made between plaintiffs who rely on direct
evidence and those who do not, the court's choice of inquiry is clear,
ami it need not rely on a quantitative judgment about whether a stated
reason was the sole reason or one of many. 142 Moreover, the distinction prevents the erroneous perception that a case involving mixed
motives is uniquely difficult and merits special analysis. Instead,
courts can step away from a "mixed motive" label and fit fact patterns
into one of the two categories of proof that Title VII case law already
recognizes. Further, a focus on the evidentiary nature of the plaintiff's case is consistent ·with the Supreme Court's pronouncements that
Title VII discrimination is a factual and not legal issue.1 43 The approach also avoids the confusing procedural situation that occurs
when courts try to apply a mixed-motives analysis by combining the
direct- and indirect-evidence inquiries, 144 which are inconsistent. Fi141. "Since defendants are not usually clear whether they are advancing a proper reason as
the sole or only an additional reason for the adverse action, it is not surprising that fact-finders
are not always· clear as to which analysis they are using." Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839
F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
142. It is unclear whether this approach would be useful for other anti-discrimination statutes, such as the ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provide for jury trials, since fashioning
jury instructions poses special problems. See Stonefield, supra note 4, at 119 n.123 and 170
n.329. However, the simpler approach that the direct/indirect evidence distinction embodies
would likely be similarly helpful to a jury. Cf. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097,
1102 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988) (mixed-motive analysis applies to cases under ADEA and § 1981).
It is also unclear whether this approach would be appropriate for Title VII class actions. See
generally General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 4, at 1216-70; 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, §§ 49.50-49.62. The Supreme
Court has stated that McDonnell Douglas is relevant only "in a private, non-class action." 411
U.S. at 800. And it is unlikely that a mixed-motive scenario, where an employer purportedly acts
for two or several different reasons, could be reconciled with a Title VII class action, which
requires that a plaintiff prove that the alleged discrimination was the employer's regular or standard operating procedure. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307
(1977).
143. "[A] finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact." Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 28687 (1982) (a finding of discriminatory intent under seniority provisions of Title VII is factual,
subject to clearly erroneous standard on appeal); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617,
2623 (1987).
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has argued, in addition, that the distinction between a
"pretext" analysis (as in McDonnell Douglas) and a "but for" analysis (as in Mt. Healthy) is
grounded in "different factual inquiries." NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33, 42 (2d
Cir. 1981) (Newman, J., concurring). "Simply stated, 'pretext' analysis asks, 'What happened?'
'But for' analysis asks, 'What would have happened?' " 646 F.2d at 42.
144. "To determine liability by first applying the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework
and then, if it appears at the trial that there were mixed motives, to superimpose some burdenshifting procedure on top of this framework, would be to compound procedural refinements in a
confusing and ultimately unproductive fashion." Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae at
18, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). See also Brief for
Respondent at 35-36 (arguing that it is "confusing doctrinally" to have separate tests for mixedmotive cases. "In all cases - whether involving a single or several motives - [the plaintiff's]
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nally, the approach correctly distinguishes between the issues of proof
and causation. Questions such as "but for," "same decision," or
"substantial factor" - causation questions - would be explicitly reserved until the court makes the initial determination that the plaintiff
is relying on direct evidence of discrimination. 145
VI.

CONCLUSION

At best, "mixed-motive" is a term of convenience that allows
courts to conceptualize fact patterns as they believe they occurred in
reality. Courts should recognize that the term is unhelpful, and doctrinally confusing, when stretched beyond its descriptive limits and
used as an analytical tool in adjudication of Title VII claims. When a
court affixes the "mixed-motive" label to a case, it implicitly acknowledges that the case's facts do not initially compel a holding for either
party, and that a more searching inquiry will be required. The Title
VII case law has dealt with the tension reflected in these difficult factual resolutions by devising two distinct lines of analysis that depend
on the nature· of the plaintiff's evidence. The "µtlxed-motive" paradigm diverts attention from that effort; a more useful approach is to
focus on whether the plaintiff's evidence is direct or indirect, and to
select the appropriate causation inquiry following the initial offer of
proof.
By relying on the inherent distinction between direct and indirect
evidence, and the respective mode of analysis each type of evidence
embodies, courts also can keep clear the separate issues of proof and
causation. A plaintiff's attempt to show that the employer considered
an impermissible factor in making the employment decision involves
questions of proof; a plaintiff's further attempt to show that the
proven factor controlled the employer's decision involves questions of
causation. The "mixed-motive" analysis needlessly combines those issues, but the direct/indirect evidence analysis explicitly recognizes
that proof issues are primary and that causation issues arise only when
the proof question is answered by direct evidence.
Recognition of these crucial distinctions in the Title VII case law
allows courts to assess plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in a principled fashion. Discarding the mixed-motive paradigm and replacing it
with a wider application of the direct/indirect evidence approach can
burden [of persuasion] is satisfied by proof that discrimination affected the challenged decision.
And the employer always retains the opportunity to try to limit relief after the violation has been
established.").
145. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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help foster the efficient and judicious resolution of disparate treatment
claims under Title VII.

- Robert S. Whitman

